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Abstract—Virtualization has been seen as one of the main
evolution trends in the forthcoming fifth generation (5G) cellular
networks which enables the decoupling of infrastructure from
the services it provides. In this case, the roles of infrastructure
providers (InPs) and mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs)
can be logically separated and the resources (e.g., subchannels,
power, and antennas) of a base station owned by an InP can
be transparently shared by multiple MVNOs, while each MVNO
virtually owns the entire BS. Naturally, the issue of resource
allocation arises. In particular, the InP is required to abstract
the physical resources into isolated slices for each MVNO who
then allocates the resources within the slice to its subscribed
users. In this paper, we aim to address this two-level hierarchical
resource allocation problem while satisfying the requirements of
efficient resource allocation, strict inter-slice isolation, and the
ability of intra-slice customization. To this end, we design a
hierarchical combinatorial auction mechanism, based on which
a truthful and sub-efficient resource allocation framework is
provided. Specifically, winner determination problems (WDPs)
are formulated for the InP and MVNOs, and computationally
tractable algorithms are proposed to solve these WDPs. Also,
pricing schemes are designed to ensure incentive compatibility.
The designed mechanism can achieve social efficiency in each
level even if each party involved acts selfishly. Numerical results
show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
Index Terms—5G cellular, massive MIMO, wireless network
virtualization, resource allocation, mechanism design, hierar-
chical combinatorial auction, incentive compatibility, winner
determination problem (WDP).
I. INTRODUCTION
The next generation cellular wireless networks (i.e., 5G
networks) are expected to be deployed around 2020 which
are envisioned to provide higher data rate, lower end-to-end
latency, improved spectrum/energy efficiency, and reduced cost
per bit. In general, addressing these requirements will require
significantly larger amount of spectrum, more aggressive fre-
quency reuse, extreme densification of small cells, and the
wide use of several enabling technologies (e.g., full-duplex,
massive MIMO, C-RAN, and wireless virtualization) [1]. In
this paper, we will focus on the issue of wireless virtualization
which has been receiving increasing attentions from both
academia and industry [2]–[4].
The main idea of wireless virtualization is to enable resource
sharing and to decouple the infrastructure from the services
it provides. Accordingly, the role of infrastructure provider
(InP) needs to be logically separated from the role of service
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providers1. And the InP can provide the infrastructure as a
service (IasS) to mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs)
who may not have their own infrastructure and/or wireless
network resources. Specifically, the physical resources (e.g.,
infrastructure, spectrum, power, backhaul/fronthaul, and an-
tennas) of a base station (BS) owned by an InP are abstracted
into isolated virtual resources (i.e., slices) which are then
transparently shared among different MVNOs. Each MVNO
virtually owns the entire BS with the resources provided in
the allocated slice.
Several benefits can be achieved through such decoupling
and sharing (i.e., virtualization). First, the resource utilization
can be improved through moderating the dynamic require-
ments of users from different MVNOs (i.e., statistical mul-
tiplexing gains). Second, the capital expenses (CapEx) and
operation expenses (OpEx) can be reduced through sharing.
Third, lower entry barrier for small service providers could
enrich the services provided to users.
A significant challenge for wireless virtualization is resource
allocation which addresses the problem of how to slice the
physical resources for virtual networks of MVNOs to accom-
modate the dynamic demands of their subscribed users, while
satisfying the requirements of efficient resource allocation,
inter-slice isolation, and the ability of intra-slice customization.
The problem is more challenging if the agents involved are
self-interested. That is, how to design a mechanism that can
achieve a desirable social efficiency2 even when each agent
acts selfishly.
In general, there are two types of implementation schemes
for resource allocation in wireless virtualization. In the first
type, the InP plays the central role who directly allocates the
physical resources to users of different MVNOs according to
certain requirements (e.g., pre-determined resource sharing ra-
tios). In the second type, the MVNOs are also involved which
makes the resource allocation problem a hierarchical (i.e., two-
level) problem. In this case, the InP is only responsible for
allocating the resources to each MVNO, while each MVNO
manages the resource allocation for its users.
Most of the existing work on resource allocation for wireless
virtualization can be categorized into the first type. Specifi-
cally, in [5]–[8], optimization-based dynamic resource alloca-
tion schemes were proposed. In [9], a stochastic game based
scheme was proposed. The schemes in these work can achieve
high resource utilization. However, since the MVNOs are not
involved in the resource allocation, the capability of intra-
slice customization for each MVNO cannot be easily achieved.
Besides, the computation complexity for InP is high consider-
1We assume that the InP does not provide services directly to users.
2By desirable social efficiency we mean that the social welfare, that results
from the behaviors of all agents, can achieve a certain required value.
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2ing that the optimal resource allocation has to be obtained
directly for all users. A few work considered the problem
of resource allocation to MVNOs. For example, in [10], an
opportunistic sharing based resource allocation scheme was
proposed. In [11], a bankruptcy game was proposed for dy-
namic wireless resource allocation among multiple operators.
However, in these work the users are not involved. Besides,
most of the existing work on wireless virtualization do not
consider techniques such as massive MIMO [17], which will
be a key enabler for 5G networks. Also, the social efficiency
was not considered when agents play selfishly.
To jointly address the two-level resource allocation problem,
we design a hierarchical auction mechanism consisting of
two hierarchical auction models (i.e., a single-seller multiple-
buyer model as shown in Fig. 1 and an extended multiple-
seller multiple-buyer model as shown in Fig. 2), allocation
procedures, and the corresponding pricing schemes. Note that
auction approaches have been widely used in the literature for
resource allocation problem in wireless systems [12]. This is
due to the efficiency in both process and outcome. With the
advent of the concepts of wireless network virtualization and
spectrum secondary market in cognitive radio networks, the
middlemen (e.g., MVNOs) play more important roles in bridg-
ing the supply from resource owners with the demands from
end users. However, almost all existing work on application
of auction mechanisms for resource allocation only consider
single-level auctions without involving the middlemen. To the
best of our knowledge, the work in [13] is the first work on
this topic in which some qualitative analyses were provided but
without application. Besides, there is a social planner control-
ling the entire resource allocation of all players. In this case,
it cannot satisfy the requirement of intra-slice customization
for wireless virtualization. The work in [14] proposed a three-
stage auction mechanism for spectrum trading. However, the
middleman can submit bids for multiple items but can acquire
at most one. The work in [15] investigated the hierarchical
resource allocation through an auction in the upper level and
a price-demand method in the lower level. Besides, all these
work only consider the single seller case. The main differences
of the proposed scheme with existing work are summarized in
Table I in Appendix A. Note that compared with hierarchical
game based approach (e.g., Stackelberg game in [16]) in
which the social welfare under equilibrium strategies may not
be the optimal ones in sub-games, the proposed hierarchical
auction mechanism achieves social efficiency at each level3.
Based on the proposed hierarchical auction mechanism, a
truthful and sub-efficient semi-distributed resource allocation
framework for wireless virtualization is provided. Specifically,
the proposed hierarchical auction models consist of two levels
of combinatorial auctions. In the lower-level auction, the users
act as the bidder and each MVNO acts as a seller, while in
the upper-level auction, the MVNOs act as the bidders and the
InP acts as the seller. The role of an MVNO can be regarded
as that of a middleman. Note that the two-level auctions are
3Note that there is a gap between the allocation efficiency achieved by a
general sharing scheme (i.e., the InP directly allocates resources to all users)
and that achieved by the hierarchical auction mechanism. Therefore, we use
the term ‘sub-efficient’ for the entire hierarchical auction. This can also be
seen as the cost due to the introduction of middlemen.
dependent considering the fact that the MVNOs do not have
intrinsic demands and valuations, which however depend on
the demands and resale gains from users.
To determine the optimal amount of resources allocated
to each bidder, winner determination problems (WDPs) are
formulated, and the corresponding solution algorithms are pro-
posed. Also, pricing schemes are designed to ensure incentive
compatibility, which is critical for achieving social efficiency.
The proposed scheme can satisfy the three requirements
mentioned above. First, efficient resource allocation can be
achieved in each level by allocating resources to bidders with
higher valuations. Second, we can achieve flexible but strict
inter-slice isolation in the sense that once the resources are
allocated to an MVNO, these resources can only be allocated
to the users of that MVNO (i.e., strict), while the amount
of resources allocated to each MVNO can be dynamically
changed (i.e., flexible). Third, intra-slice customization can
be achieved due to the involvement of MVNOs which can
individually decide how the resources within the slice can be
allocated. Also, compared with totally centralized allocation
schemes (e.g., schemes of the first type), the computational
complexity can be reduced considering two facts. First, the
computation is distributed among InP and MVNOs, each
of which only needs to calculate the allocation for its own
bidders. Second, the dimension of the winner determination
problem faced by each MVNO is relatively small considering
that the available resources are only a subset of the entire BS
resources.
The novelty and main contributions of this paper can be
summarized as follows:
• A hierarchical combinatorial auction mechanism is de-
signed to jointly address the hierarchical resource al-
location for wireless virtualization in massive MIMO
networks.
• The proposed scheme can satisfy the three requirements
of wireless virtualzaiton. Also, it jointly considers the
feasibility, admission control, and allocation problems in
a unified resource allocation framework.
• Several desirable properties of the hierarchical auction
mechanism (i.e., incentive compatibility, individual ra-
tionality, and allocation efficiency in each level) can be
achieved with appropriate design of allocation and pricing
schemes.
• The computations are migrated to different parties which
lowers the complexity for each party. Also, computa-
tionally tractable algorithms are proposed for solving the
WDPs.
• While most of the existing auction-based resource allo-
cation schemes only consider one dimensional resource
(e.g., in most cases the spectrum), we consider the alloca-
tion with more degrees of freedom (i.e., frequency, power,
and spatial). Also, most existing work only consider
single-minded bidder, while we consider both single-
minded and general valuation bidders4.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the system model, assumptions, and presents
4The definitions of single-minded and general valuations will be given in
Section III.
3the proposed hierarchical combinatorial auction models. In
Section III, the resource allocation for wireless virtualization is
investigated. WDP formulations are given and the correspond-
ing solution algorithms and pricing schemes are presented.
Also, theoretical analysis of the auction properties is provided.
In Section IV, the auction model is extended to consider multi-
seller multi-buyer case. Numerical results and analysis are
presented in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL, ASSUMPTIONS, AND PROPOSED
HIERARCHICAL COMBINATORIAL AUCTION MODELS
A. Channel Model and Assumptions
For the system model, we consider the downlink trans-
mission of an OFDMA-based cellular system with an InP
providing infrastructure services (including base stations and
wireless resources) to a set of M = {1, 2, . . . ,M} MVNOs.
Each MVNO m then provides services to Km subscribed users
in the considered cell. The InP owns a set of C = {1, 2, . . . , C}
subchannels each with bandwidth W . Universal frequency
reuse is considered for all cells. The base station (BS) in each
cell is equipped with A antennas and each user equipment has
a single antenna (i.e., multi-user MIMO). We assume A to be
large (e.g., several hundreds) to achieve massive MIMO effect
which scales up traditional MIMO by orders of magnitude.
The multi-cell system is operated in time-division duplexing
(TDD) mode and we assume that all BSs and UEs are per-
fectly synchronized. For achieving all the benefits of massive
MIMO, the base station requires channel state information for
precoding. To this end, channel reciprocity is exploited. That
is the downlink channel is obtained by the Hermitian transpose
of the uplink channel, which can be estimated by the BS
from the uplink pilots transmitted by each user. Note that by
operating in TDD mode, the massive MIMO system is scalable
in the sense that the time required for pilots is proportional
to the number of users served per cell and is independent of
the number of antennas [17]. Also, the channel responses are
assumed to be invariant during the symbol time.
Massive MIMO uses spatial-division multiplexing. In this
case, the BS can serve multiple users in the same time-
frequency resource block. We assume that for each subchannel,
the maximum number of users can be served simultaneously
is J , which is limited by the coherence time and accordingly
the number of orthogonal pilots.
The downlink received signal for a user k of MVNO m on
subchannel n in the considered cell is given by
sˆnk =
√
pnkdkgkh
T
k (n)fk(n)s
n
k +
∑
j 6=k
√
pnj dkgk
hTk (n)fj(n)s
n
j +
∑
l 6=o
√
pnl dklgklh
T
kl(n)fkl(n)s
n
l + z
n
k , (1)
where the first term in the right hand side of (1) denotes the
desired signal for user k, while the second and the third terms
represent the subchannel reuse interference within the cell and
the interference from other cells, respectively. Specifically, pnk
is the transmit power for the link from the BS to user k
in subchannel n, dk and gk represent the path-loss and the
shadowing gain, respectively. hk(n) ∈ CAm×1 denotes the
small-scale fading between the BS and user k on subchannel
n which is the Hermitian transpose of the uplink channel,
where Am is the number of antennas allocated to MVNO m.
fk(n) ∈ CAm×1 represents the precoding vector used by the
BS. snk is the transmit signal, and z
n
k denotes the additive
noise with distribution CN (0, N0), where N0 is the noise
power spectral density. Accordingly, the received signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) for user k in subchannel
n can be expressed as
Γnk =
pnkdkgkf
T
k (n)hk(n)h
T
k (n)fk(n)
WN0 + Ireuse + Iothercell
, (2)
where Ireuse and Iothercell represent the interference terms.
The ergodic achievable downlink rate for user k in subchannel
n can be obtained as
rnk = WE[log(1 + Γnk )]. (3)
The above ergodic achievable rate is difficult to calculate
for finite system dimensions. Instead, to achieve a tight
approximation for finite systems, an asymptotic analysis is
performed in [18] assuming that the number of antennas Am
and the number of users Km approach infinity while keeping
a finite ratio. Based on the results in [18], ignoring estimation
noise and considering inter-user interference to be negligible
compared with noise and pilot contamination in large scale
multiuser (MU)-MIMO systems (the user channels decorrelate
with large number of BS antennas, and strong desired signal
can be received with little inter-user interference [19]), a
deterministic approximation of SINR for user k of MVNO
m in subchannel n can be obtained as
Γˆk(n) =
1
L¯
ρk(n)Am
+ α(L¯− 1) , (4)
where ρk(n) represents the transmit SNR, L¯ = 1 + α(L− 1)
and L represents the number of cells, α represents the intercell
interference factor, α(L¯−1) is the pilot contamination caused
by the reuse of pilot sequences in other cells, which primarily
limits the performance of massive MIMO systems [20]. Ac-
cordingly, the approximate achievable downlink rate for user
k can be expressed as
rk =
∑
n∈Cm
yk(n)W log(1 + Γˆk(n)), (5)
where Cm is the set of subchannels allocated to MVNO m,
yk(n) is the assignment indicator with yk(n) = 1 indicating
subchannel n is assigned to user k, and yk(n) = 0 otherwise.
Note that equation (4) is obtained without assuming that
Am  Km (i.e., assume Am → ∞ while keeping Km fixed
when analyzing the SINR). Instead, it considers more practical
settings where the number of BS antennas is not extremely
large compared with the number of users. This is suitable for
our system model since the BS antennas need to be partitioned
for different MVNOs.
B. Wireless Virtualization Model
For wireless network virtualization, isolation among dif-
ferent virtualized wireless networks for different MVNOs is
a basic requirement which can be done at different levels
(e.g., flow level [21], [22] and physical resource level [5]–[8],
4[10], [11]). In general, isolation at a higher level is simpler
for implementation while at the cost of possible inefficient
allocation and non-strict isolation. In contrast, isolation at a
lower level could achieve better resource utilization at the
cost of higher computational complexity. In this work, we
consider the isolation to be performed at physical resource
(i.e., subchannel, power, and antenna) level.
Also, isolation at the physical resource level can be im-
plemented in different manners. The first is a static fixed
sharing scheme with which the MNVOs are preassigned a
fixed subset of physical resources in different domains, and
the access is restricted within this fixed subset. The second
is a dynamic general sharing scheme with which there is
no restriction on the resource access, while the isolation is
achieved by guaranteeing certain pre-determined requirements
(e.g., minimum share of the resources). In this work, we
adopt a hybrid isolation scheme in between. Specifically, the
InP reserves certain amounts of resources for each MVNO
according to pre-determined service agreements, while the
leftover resources can be dynamically shared by all MVNOs
(e.g., through auctions). Note that this model can also be
applied to the case that some MVNOs own certain resources.
C. The Proposed Hierarchical Auction Models
In general, an auction process involves the following en-
tities: a) bidders who want to buy certain commodities, b)
sellers who want to sell certain commodities, and c) an
auctioneer who hosts and directs the auction process. An
auction mechanism mainly involves the following procedures:
• Bidding procedure: each bidder i places a bid bi ac-
cording to its own valuation vi of the item/items to be
auctioned. The valuation is a private information which
represents the maximum a bidder is willing to pay for
the item/items. Different bidders could have different
valuations for the same item/items.
• Allocation procedure: after collecting the bids from all
participating bidders, the auctioneer needs to determine
how to allocate the item/items among the bidders for
achieving certain objectives. A bidder is a winning bidder
if the resource requirement in her bid is satisfied.
• Pricing procedure: after determining the allocation, the
auctioneer also needs to determine the price qi charged
to each winning bidder i.
In this work, two hierarchical (i.e., two-level) combinatorial
auction models are proposed for wireless network virtualiza-
tion as shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.
1) Single-seller multiple-buyer hierarchical auction model:
We first consider a single-seller multiple-buyer case (i.e., the
model in Fig. 1) with which the bidders (e.g., users) can only
acquire resources from a single seller. The entire hierarchical
auction consists of sub-auctions in two levels. Specifically, in
the upper level, the InP, who owns the physical resources,
holds a sub-auction and acts as the seller as well as the
auctioneer. The MVNOs act as the bidders (i.e., buyers). In the
lower level, each MVNO then holds a sub-auction acting as the
seller and the subscribed users act as the bidders (accordingly,
there are M sub-auctions in the lower level).
As stated in Section II-B, we consider a hybrid isolation
scheme. In this case, each MVNO m reserves Cresm number
of subchannels, P resm amount of power, and A
res
m number of
antennas, where
∑M
m=1 C
res
m ≤ C,
∑M
m=1 P
res
m ≤ P , and∑M
m=1A
res
m ≤ A. The leftover Cup = C−
∑M
m=1 C
res
m number
of subchannels, P up = P −∑Mm=1 P resm amount of power,
and Aup = A − ∑Mm=1Aresm number of antennas are the
commodities to be auctioned among the MVNOs in the upper
level auction. Denote by Cm ≥ 0, Pm ≥ 0, and Am ≥ 0 the
resources obtained by MVNO m in the upper-level auction,
then for each user of MVNO m in the lower-level auction, the
available resources are Cˆm = Cresm + Cm, Pˆm = P
res
m + Pm,
and Aˆm = Aresm +Am.
Note that the hierarchical auction model is not a simple
combination of two levels of separated auctions due to the
involvement of middlemen. Specifically, unlike the users (i.e.,
bidders) in the lower-level auction, the MVNOs as middlemen
do not have intrinsic demands5. Furthermore, the MVNOs do
not have intrinsic valuations of the resources, and the valuation
depends on the resale revenue which is also shown in [13]. In
this case, the two level auctions are interrelated and should be
studied jointly (e.g., in a way similar to that for analyzing a
hierarchical game).
Fig. 1. A single-seller multiple-buyer hierarchical auction model.
In the proposed hierarchical auction model, we consider the
bidders to be self-interested each of which carefully chooses
the bidding strategy to maximize her own utility under the
given designed auction mechanism (including allocation and
pricing procedures). Specifically, we consider a quasilinear
utility of the following form:
ui = vi − qi, (6)
which represents the difference between valuation and the
price charged. The equilibrium bidding behavior can be an-
alyzed by using noncooperative game theory (e.g., a Bayesian
game considering that the valuations are private information).
Note that there are several desirable properties when designing
an auction mechanism: 1) individual rationality; 2) incentive
compatibility; 3) allocation efficiency. The definitions for these
are given below.
Definition 1: An auction mechanism is individual rational
if for any bidder i, ui ≥ 0.
The individual rationality indicates that a bidder will be
never charged more than her valuation of the received resource.
Definition 2: An auction mechanism is incentive compatible
(truthful) if and only if for every bidder i with true valuation
5Note that the demand of an MVNO is not simply the sum of the demands
from all users, since it may not be optimal for her.
5vi and for any valuation declaration of the other bidders b˜−i,
we have ui(vi, b˜−i) ≥ ui(b˜i, b˜−i), where b˜i 6= vi is any non-
truthful bidding strategy.
That is, truth telling is a dominant strategy for each bidder
no matter how other bidders place their bids.
Definition 3: An allocation is efficient if the sum of valua-
tions of all accepted bids is maximized.
In the proposed scheme, these properties are achieved by
the use of combinatorial auction [26] with appropriate design
of allocation and pricing schemes. Specifically, for the sub-
auction mechanism in each level, we adopt combinatorial
auction which allows the bidders to express preferences over
bundles or combinations of resources (e.g., bundles of sub-
channels, power, and antennas for a slice). The consideration
of bidding for bundles of resources stems from the fact that
the value of a bundle of items may not be equal to the sum of
individual value of each item in the bundle. That is, there are
possible substitution and complementarity properties among
the items. In this case, the combinatorial auction can lead to
more efficient allocations (in terms of both auction process and
outcome) compared with the case where a traditional single-
item auction is repeated for each item in the bundle.
In a combinatorial auction, for each bidder i, the valuation
vi is a mapping from a bundle of items Si to a real value.
A bidder is a winning bidder and receives value vi(Si) if all
the items in the bundle Si are allocated, otherwise the bidder
receives nothing and the received value is zero (i.e., vi(∅) =
0). The valuation function should also satisfy the monotone
property. That is, for any S ⊆ T we have that vi(S) ≤ vi(T ).
Note that different from single-item auction, there could exist
multiple winning bidders in a combinatorial auction.
The social welfare obtained by a combinatorial auction is
denoted by
V =
∑
vi(Si), (7)
and a socially efficient allocation is an allocation with maxi-
mum social welfare among all allocations such that
V ∗ = max
∑
vi(Si). (8)
In our scheme, the use of combinatorial auction can achieve
social efficiency in each level if all bidders bid truthfully,
while pricing schemes are designed for ensuring the incentive
compatibility. The details of incentive compatible pricing
schemes will be introduced in Section III.
Fig. 2. A multiple-seller multiple-buyer hierarchical auction model.
2) Multiple-seller multiple-buyer hierarchical auction
model: We then extend the above single-seller multiple-buyer
model to a multiple-seller multiple-buyer model as shown in
Fig. 2. The main difference is that there exists multiple sellers
at each level and each bidder could acquire resources from
one of the multiple sellers6. Compared with the single-seller
model, the multiple-seller model provides more flexibility for
bidders which accounts for service selection (or user asso-
ciation) and accordingly induces higher efficiency in resource
allocation. For example, in the lower level, the user association
is not fixed for all K =
∑
kKm users. Instead, a user will
be associated with the MVNO that can satisfy her resource
requirement. Accordingly, the competition among MVNOs is
explicitly captured in the sense that the MVNO with larger
amount of resources could attract more users.
It is worth noting that different from the single-seller model,
the MVNOs and InPs are not acting as the auctioneers in the
multiple-seller model. Instead, service brokers are introduced
as external auctioneers at each level on behalf of the sellers
(i.e., the MVNOs and the InPs). The bidders in each level
submits bids to the corresponding service broker who then
determines the resource allocation and pricing.
III. WIRELESS NETWORK VIRTUALIZATION AS A
SINGLE-SELLER MULTIPLE-BUYER HIERARCHICAL
COMBINATORIAL AUCTION
In this section, we will show how the proposed single-seller
multiple-buyer hierarchical combinatorial auction model can
be applied for virtualization of wireless resources in OFDMA-
based 5G networks with massive MIMO. Specifically, we will
answer the following questions: 1) how do the bidders (i.e.,
users in the lower-level auction and MVNOs in the upper-
level auction) place their bids? 2) how to determine the set
of winning bids (i.e., the winner determination problem in
the context of combinatorial auction)? 3) how to solve the
WDP in a computationally tractable manner? 4) how to price
the winning bidders such that incentive compatibility can be
achieved? Besides, theoretical analysis of the properties of the
proposed hierarchical auction mechanism is also provided.
A. How to Place a Bid?
1) Bids for users: We consider two cases.
Case I: We consider that the users explicitly express
their intrinsic physical resource demands (which is the case
considered in most existing work) when applying auction
schemes for wireless resource allocation. In this case, each
user explicitly requests a bundle of resources Sk from her
associated MVNO m with
Sk = {yk,pk, Ak}, (9)
where yk = [yk(n)]Cˆm , pk = [pk(n)]Cˆm , and Ak are the
subchannel request vector, power request vector, and antenna
request, respectively. Note that in this paper, energy efficiency
is not considered. Therefore, all the available antennas of an
MVNO will be activated for achieving the best performance.
Accordingly, we have Ak = Aˆm, ∀k ∈ Km.
We assume that the users are single-minded [24] who are
only interested in a specific set of commodities, and the
6We assume that a user will not be served simultaneously by multiple
MVNOs.
6valuation will be a specified scalar value if the whole set is
allocated, and will be zero otherwise. The definition is given
as follows:
Definition 4: A bidder k is single-minded if there is a set of
commodities Sk and a scalar value a such that the valuation
vk(S) =
{
a, ∀S ⊇ Sk,
0, otherwise.
(10)
For a single-minded user k with explicit resource demand,
the bid can be simply expressed as a pair {Sk, bk(Sk)}. The
valuation of the requested resources depends on the application
type and could be different for different users. In this paper, we
consider a linear function vk(rk(Sk)) = δkrk(Sk), where δk
is a constant and rk(Sk) is the achievable rate if the requested
resource bundle Sk is allocated. The consideration of valuation
functions for different types of applications is straightforward
and will not change the formulation and analysis. Also, the
valuation function considering desirability of the resources can
be designed.
Case II: We consider that each user k implicitly expresses
her resource demand by simply indicating an intrinsic target
rate of R˜k. How the resources in different dimensions are
allocated to satisfy the rate requirements is left with the
MVNOs who have much stronger computation power.
In this case, the bid pair for user k with implicit resource
demand is expressed as {R˜k, bk(R˜k))} and the same valuation
function applies for the implicit case.
2) Bids for MVNOs: For MVNOs, the bids are different
from that of the users since the MVNOs are middlemen who
do not have intrinsic demands and valuations. Accordingly,
they cannot be considered to be single-minded. Instead, in
the upper-level auction, each MVNO will need to submit
bids for all possible set of resource bundles (i.e., general
valuations)7. Also, we consider that the MVNOs explicitly
express their physical resource demands to the InP, and the bid
for each MVNO can be expressed as a combination of pairs
{Sm, bm(Sm)}, ∀Sm ∈ Ωm, where Sm = {Cm, Pm, Am}
is a tuple representing the requested number of subchannels
Cm, the amount of transmit power Pm, and the number of
antennas Am, and Ωm = {Cup, P up, Aup} represents the set
of all possible resource bundles.
Note that although an MNVO can submit combinations of
bids, we adopt XOR-bid with which at most one bid can be
accepted for each MVNO. For an MVNO m with auctioned
resource tuple Sm, let us denote by qk(Sm) ≥ 0 the price
charged to user k in the lower-level auction. Then the valuation
of resource Sm can be expressed as
vm(Sm) =
∑
k∈Km
qk(Sm)− qresm , (11)
where qresm is the cost for reserved resources.
A summary of the key elements of the hierarchical auction
model is provided in Table I.
B. How to Determine the Winning Bids?
After collecting the bids from the bidders, the auctioneer
needs to determine which set of bids to be accepted. For the
7In practice, the set of bids submitted can be restricted considering only
available/feasible ones.
TABLE I
A SUMMARY OF KEY ELEMENTS IN THE PROPOSED HIERARCHICAL
AUCTION MODEL
Demand Valuation Bid Utility Price
UEex Sk vk(Sk) bk(Sk) vk − qk qk
UEim R˜k vk(R˜k) bk(R˜k) vk − qk qk
MVNO N.A.
∑
k qk − qresm {bm(Sm)}
∑
k qk − qm − qresm qm
InP N.A. N.A. N.A.
∑
m qm N.A.
proposed hierarchical auction model, we need to formulate
the winner determination problems (WDPs) for both InP as
the auctioneer in the upper-level auction and MVNOs as
auctioneers in the lower-level auctions.
1) WDP formulation for the InP: Each MVNO m submits
a bid combination {Sm, bm(Sm)} for all possible Sm ⊆ Ωm
and the objective of the InP is to maximize the sum value
of accepted bids. Accordingly, the WDP for the InP in the
upper-level auction is formulated as
max
xm(Sm)
∑
m∈M
∑
Sm⊆Ωm
bm(Sm)xm(Sm)
s.t.
∑
Sm⊆Ωm
∑
m∈M
xm(Sm)Cm(Sm) ≤ Cup, (12)∑
Sm⊆Ωm
∑
m∈M
xm(Sm)Am(Sm) ≤ Aup, (13)∑
Sm⊆Ωm
∑
m∈M
xm(Sm)Pm(Sm) ≤ P up, (14)∑
Sm⊆Ωm
xm(Sm) ≤ 1,∀ m ∈M, (15)
xm(Sm) ∈ {0, 1},∀ Sm,m, (16)
where xm(Sm) is a binary variable with xm(Sm) = 1
indicating that the requested resource bundle Sm is accepted
and xm(Sm) = 0 otherwise, Cm(Sm), Pm(Sm), and Am(Sm)
represent the number of subchannels, the amount of power, and
the number of antennas requested in Sm. The constraints (12)-
(14) ensure that the accepted resource demands do not exceed
the available capacity, while the constraint (15) ensures that
no bidder receives more than one set of resources.
Remark Since the power is divisible, having general valua-
tions for each specific amount of power is impossible. In this
case, in the upper level auction, we consider the power to be
discretized based on certain unit, and each MVNO specifies
the number of power units required in each resource bundle.
While such discretization is not necessary in the lower-level
auction since the user is single-minded.
2) WDP formulation for the MVNOs: The WDP for each
MVNO m in the lower-level auction considering single-
minded users with explicit resource requirements (i.e., Case
7I) is formulated as
max
xk
∑
k∈Km
bk(Sk)xk
s.t.
∑
k∈Km
pk(Sk)xk ≤ Pˆm, (17)∑
k∈Km
∑
Sk3n
xk ≤ J, ∀n, (18)
xk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k, (19)
where xk is the decision variable indicating whether the
resource demand from user k can be satisfied, pk(Sk) =∑
n∈Cˆm pk(n) is the total power requested by user k, and
Sk 3 n if yk(n) = 1. The objective is also to maximize
the sum value of accepted bids, and thus achieving efficient
resource allocation as required by wireless virtualization8. The
first constraint ensures that the sum power of all accepted bids
does not exceed the available total power. The second con-
straint indicates that the number of users sharing a subchannel
cannot exceed J .
Note that the WDPs for MVNOs with explicit resource
requirement from users are simpler comparing with that for
the InP since the users are single-minded and therefore do not
require general valuations.
Similarly, the WDP for each MVNO m considering single-
minded users with implicit resource requirements (i.e., Case
II) is formulated as
max
xk,zk(S˜k)
∑
k∈Km
bk(R˜k)xk
s.t. rk(S˜k(y˜k, p˜k, Am)) = R˜k, ∀S˜k ∈ Ωk, (20)∑
k∈Km
∑
S˜k∈Ωk
∑
S˜k3n
zk(S˜k) ≤ J, ∀n, (21)∑
k∈Km
∑
S˜k∈Ωk
pk(S˜k)zk(S˜k) ≤ Pˆm, (22)∑
S˜k∈Ωk
zk(S˜k) ≤ 1, ∀k, (23)
xk, zk(S˜k) ∈ {0, 1}, (24)
where xk = 1 indicates the rate demand of user k can be
satisfied, and xk = 0 otherwise, S˜k = {y˜k, p˜k, Am} is
the tuple representing a resource allocation profile consider-
ing the freedoms in power, frequency, and spatial domains.
Specifically, y˜k = [y˜k(n)]Cˆm is the subchannel allocation
vector with y˜k(n) = 1 indicating subchannel k is assigned
to user k. p˜k = [pk(n)]Cˆm is the power allocation vector.
Equation (20) is the rate constraint which requires the resource
allocation profile S˜k should satisfy the user rate requirement9.
The achievable rate can be calculated from (5). The set of
all resource allocation profiles S˜k for user k constitutes the
set Ωk. zk(Sk) is an indicator with value 1 indicating the
allocation profile Sk is accepted, and 0 otherwise. Apparently
xk = 1 if there exists zk(S˜k) = 1 for all S˜k. Equation (21)
8Note that the fairness among users is not considered.
9Note that if minimum rate requirement is considered, the ‘=’ in (20) will
be replaced by ‘≥’. The use of minimum rate requirement will not change
the analysis since it only increases the number of allocation strategies for
satisfying the rate requirement.
indicates that the number of users sharing a subchannel cannot
exceed J . Equation (23) indicates that for a user k, at most
one allocation profile S˜k ∈ Ωk can be accepted.
Remark It can be observed that the above optimization prob-
lem is fundamental for resource allocation which jointly con-
siders feasibility, admission control, and allocation problems
in a unified framework. Specifically, given certain degrees
of freedom in resource allocation, the solution of the above
problem gives the answers on whether the system can satisfy
the rate requirements of all users (i.e., feasibility problem).
And if not, which users should be accepted (i.e., admission
control problem), and how the resources can be allocated so
that the sum utility of all users is maximized (i.e., allocation
problem).
C. How to Solve the WDPs in the Hierarchical Auction?
Similar to solving a hierarchical game (e.g., Stackelberg
game), the method of backward induction can be used for
solving the proposed hierarchical auction problem. In this case,
we start with solving the WDP for an MVNO m in the lower-
level auction.
1) Solving the WDP in the lower-level auction: It has been
shown in the literature that the winner determination problem
of combinatorial auctions is an integer programming problem
which is NP-hard even for the single-minded cases [32]. For
simplifying the original problem, we consider two assumptions
as follows:
Assumption 1: We assume the subchannels to be homoge-
neous for each end user (i.e., the channel gains of different
subchannels are the same for a user, while they can be different
for different users). Accordingly, equal power is allocated to
each assigned subchannel.
Assumption 2: The achievable rate of a user is independent
of which other users are sharing the same channel.
These assumptions are practical for massive MIMO systems
since the small-scale fading are averaged out and only the
large-scale fading (e..g, path-loss and shadowing) affects. Ac-
cordingly, the SINR is constant with respect to frequency since
the slow fading coefficients are independent of frequency [20].
Also, the users’ channels decorrelate with the increasing
number of BS antennas [19].
Based on these two assumptions, the WDP for MVNO with
explicit user resource request can be reformulated as
max
xk
∑
k∈Km
bk(Sk)xk
s.t.
∑
k∈Km
pk(Sk)xk ≤ Pˆm, (25)∑
k∈Km
ck(Sk)xk ≤ CˆmJ, (26)
xk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k, (27)
where ck ∈ [0, C˜m] and pk ∈ [0, P˜m] represent the requested
number of subchannels and power, respectively. Note that in
this reformulation, we can use ck and pk instead of yk and pk
since we consider the channels to be homogeneous. Therefore,
the expression for the resource bundle requested by user k is
simplified as Sk = {ck, pk, Am}.
8It can be seen that the simplified problem is also an
integer program which is still NP hard. Accordingly, there
are fundamental tradeoffs between the social efficiency (op-
timality) and computational complexity. In general, there are
two possible ways for solving the reformulated WDP in a
computationally tractable manner. The first is to find the exact
optimal solution for a small problem (e.g., through dynamic
programming or branch-and-bound method) at the cost of
possible high computational complexity. The second is to
design low-complexity algorithms to find approximate optimal
solutions for large scale problems.
We first propose a dynamic programming-based algorithm
for obtaining the exact solution. The main idea is to divide
the original problem WDPm(Km, Pˆm, Cˆm) into similar sub-
problems which can be solved recursively. Specifically, we
partition the resource allocation into Km stages, and denote
by WDPm(k, e(k)) the subproblem which considers the re-
source allocation to k users with available resources e(k) =
[ec(k), ep(k)]
T, where ec(k) and ep(k) denote, respectively,
the available subchannels and power at stage k, which can also
be regarded as the state variables. In each stage k, the MVNO
m allocates uc(k) subchannels and up(k) units of power to
user k. Denote by u(k) = [uc(k), up(k)]T. Accordingly, the
state transition equation can be expressed as
e(k + 1) = e(k)− u(k).
Also, denote by x∗(k, e(k)) = [x∗1, . . . , x
∗
k] the optimal
solution to the subproblem WDPm(k, e(k)) with the corre-
sponding optimal value f(k, e(k)). Accordingly, we can have
f(k, e(k)) =
max{f(k − 1, e(k)), f(k − 1, e(k)− u(k)) + bk(Sk)}, for
k = 2, . . . ,Km. The initial condition is given by
f(1, e(1)) =
{
b1(S1), ec(1) ≥ c1(S1), ep(1) ≥ p1(S1),
−∞, otherwise.
Note that for single-minded users, we only need to consider
the state transition for fixed uc(k) and up(k) at each state.
Specifically, uc(k) = ck(Sk) and up(k) = cp(Sk) if xk = 1,
and uc(k) = 0 and up(k) = 0 if xk = 0. The details are given
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 A dynamic programming-based algorithm to
solve the WDP for MVNO with explicit user resource request
1. Initialization: collect bk(Sk) from each user k, and
calculate initialization condition f(1, e(1)).
2. For each stage and each possible state calculate the
optimal value function f(k, e(k)).
3. Output: Find f(Km, Cˆm, Pˆm) and obtain the correspond-
ing optimal allocation in each stage by using
x∗k = arg max
xk
{f(k − 1, e(k)), f(k − 1, e(k)− u(k)) + bk(Sk)}.
Compared with exhaustive enumeration with time-
complexity of O(2Km), the time-complexity of the dynamic
programming-based algorithm is of O(KmΘ2m), where
Θm = max{Cˆm, Pˆm}. The significant reduction in time-
complexity stems from the fact that the optimal value for
each stage and each state is stored and calculated only once,
while it needs to be calculated repeatedly in exhaustive
enumeration.
We also implement a polynomial-time greedy algorithm to
obtain an approximate optimal solution which is based on the
algorithm proposed in [25], [28] for WDP with single-minded
bidders. The main idea of the greedy algorithm is to allocate
the resource to bidders with larger normalized value. Specifi-
cally, after collecting all the bids from the users, the MVNO
as the auctioneer sorts the bids in a decreasing order of bk√|Sk|
which is viewed as the normalized value of a bid. Note that
since the requested resource bundle Sk consists of multiple
dimensional resources, we consider |Sk| = ωcck+ωppk, which
is a weighted sum of the number of different type of resources
requested. The details of the greedy algorithm are presented
in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 A greedy algorithm to solve the WDP for an
MVNO with explicit user resource request
1. Initialization: set c = 0 and p = 0.
2. For each submitted bid pair {Sk, bk(Sk)}, calculate
bk(Sk)/
√|Sk|. Re-index all bid pairs such that
b1(S1)√|S1| ≥ b2(S2)√|S2| ≥ · · · ≥ bKm(SKm)√|SKm | . (28)
3. For k = 1 : Km, if c+ck ≤ CˆmJ and p+pk ≤ Pˆm, then
allocate ck number of subchannels and pk units of power
to corresponding user k.
Note that with this algorithm we may only obtain an
approximate optimal solution while the dynamic programming
algorithm can obtain the exact solution. This difference will
have impacts on the choice of pricing scheme to guarantee the
incentive compatibility which will be shown next.
For the WDP of MVNO with implicit user resource request,
although the users are single-minded, there exist combinations
of resource allocation strategies for achieving the target rate
due to the freedoms in multiple domains. Accordingly, it is
equivalent to a WDP formulation with general valuations.
Given assumptions 1 and 2, the WDP for the MVNO with
implicit user resource request can be reformulated as a WDP
with general valuations as follows:
max
∑
k∈Km
∑
S˜k∈Ωk
bk(R˜k)xk(S˜k)
s.t. rk(S˜k(c˜k, p˜k, Am)) = R˜k, ∀S˜k ∈ Ωk, (29)∑
k∈Km
∑
S˜k∈Ωk
pk(S˜k)xk(S˜k) ≤ Pm, (30)∑
k∈Km
∑
S˜k∈Ωk
ck(S˜k)xk(S˜k) ≤ CˆmJ, (31)∑
S˜k∈Ωk
xk(S˜k) ≤ 1, ∀k, (32)
xk(S˜k) ∈ {0, 1}. (33)
To solve the above problem, we first need to find the set of
resource allocation strategies (i.e., Ωk) which satisfy the rate
requirement. Specifically, all the antennas available will be
activated. Also, we assume the channels to be homogeneous
9for a user. In this case, for each number of requested subchan-
nels, the power required for satisfying the rate requirement
can be calculated according to (5). After obtaining the set Ωk,
we extend the previous dynamic programming algorithm and
greedy algorithm for single-minded bidders to accommodate
the general valuation case.
Specifically, for the dynamic programming algorithm, the
main difference is that when calculating the optimal value
function, it is required to consider all possible state transitions
due to the general valuations. Specifically,
f(k, e(k)) = max
u(k)
{bk(u(k)) + f(k − 1, e(k)− u(k))},
where uc(k) ∈ [0, C˜m] and up(k) = pk(uc(k)).
To extend the greedy algorithm for the WDP with
general XOR bid, we consider the bid combinations
{S˜k, bk(S˜k)}10,∀S˜k ∈ Ωk submitted by user k as combina-
tions of bid pair {S˜k, bk(S˜k)} submitted by virtual single-
minded bidders the number of which is equal to the number
of all possible bid combinations. For example, there exists |Ωk|
number of virtual bidders with user k. Note that due to the
XOR bid, at most one virtual single-minded bidder of each
user can be accepted. To address this problem, we introduce
the concept of virtual commodity corresponding to a user. The
bid combinations of user k are extended as {S˜k
⋃
k, bk(S˜k)}.
Since the virtual commodity k can only be allocated to one
winning bidder, the original XOR bid can be realized. The
extended greedy algorithm is given in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 A greedy algorithm to solve the WDP for an
MVNO with implicit user resource request
1. Initialization: set c = 0, p = 0 and xk = 0 for each user
k.
2. For each submitted bid pair (S˜k
⋃
k, bk(S˜k)), calculate
bk(S˜k)/
√
|S˜k|. Re-index all bid pairs such that
b1(S˜1)√
|S˜1|
≥ b2(S˜2)√
|S˜2|
≥ · · · ≥ bT (S˜T )√
|S˜T |
, (34)
where T =
∑
k |Ωk|.
3. For k = 1 : T , if c+ ck(S˜k) ≤ CˆmJ , p+ pk(Sk) ≤ Pˆm,
and xk = 0, then allocate ck(S˜k) number of subchannels
and pk(Sk) amount of power to corresponding user k and
set xk = 1.
2) Solving the WDP in the upper-level auction: Compared
with users in the lower-level auction, the MVNOs are not
single-minded which results in combinations of XOR bids.
Note that the valuation of each resource bundle in the upper-
level auction depends on the resale gain in the lower-level auc-
tion, which can be obtained by solving the lower-level auction
supposing this resource bundle is allocated. After obtaining
the valuations of all resource bundles, similar algorithms for
solving the WDP with implicit resource request can be applied.
For example, with the dynamic programming-based algorithm,
10Note that bk(S˜k) is equivalent to bk(R˜k) which can be simply obtained
as a linear function of R˜k .
the resource allocation is partitioned into M stages, and the
optimal value function of each stage is
f(m, e(m)) = max
u(m)
{bm(u(m)) + f(m− 1, e(m)− u(m))},
with e(m) = [ec(m), ep(m), ea(m)]T and u(m) =
[uc(m), up(m), ua(m)]
T, where uc(m) ∈ [0, C˜up], up(m) ∈
[0, P˜ up], and ua(m) ∈ [0, A˜up].
Note that in a practical situation the number of MVNOs may
not be large (e.g,. m = 3, 4). Also, it is reasonable that the
InP sells the resources to MVNOs only in a grouped manner
(e.g., a group of 5 or 10 subchannels). Furthermore, the InP
could impose restrictions on the maximum allowable groups
of subchannels each MVNO can bid for. Accordingly, the bid
combinations can be significantly reduced and the complexity
of finding the exact optimal solutions can be reduced. Note
that, apparently, restricting the bid combinations would also
incur a tradeoff between the computational complexity and
social efficiency.
D. How to Price the Winning Bidders?
1) Pricing scheme with exact solution for the WDP: The
design of pricing scheme is of critical importance for achieving
incentive compatibility. With all bidders bidding truthfully, the
above WDPs which aim to maximize the sum of accepted bids
can also achieve social optimality at each level since bk = vk.
For single-commodity auctions, the second-price auction
(i.e., Vickrey auction [29]) has been shown to be an incentive
compatible scheme with which the winning bidder (with high-
est bid) pays the second highest bid. The VCG scheme [29]–
[31], as a generalization of the second-price auction to mul-
tiple commodities, preserves the incentive compatibility. The
intuitive idea of VCG pricing is that a bidder should pay the
potential loss they impose to other bidders. Specifically, with
VCG pricing, a bidder k will be charged
qvcgk =
∑
j 6=k
vj(S¯
∗
j )−
∑
j 6=k
vj(S
∗
j ), (35)
where S¯∗j and S
∗
j represent, respectively, the resources ob-
tained by bidder j when bidder k is not participating and
is participating. For a winning bidder, the VCG price is the
decrease of welfare of all other bidders caused by her presence.
Note that the VCG prices are nonnegative.
Although the VCG pricing can achieve incentive compati-
bility, it is not designed for maximizing the seller’s revenue. In
some cases, the resulting revenue (e.g.,
∑
qvcgk ) can be even
far from the optimal one. For example, if there are sufficient
resources such that the requirements of all bidders can be
satisfied, the VCG price for each bidder is zero. This could
cause problem for MVNOs whose valuations depend on the
revenue gained from resale. Specifically, with VCG pricing,
the valuation vm(Sm) could decrease with an increasing
number of resources in Sm which may motivate the MVNO
to lease less resources.
To address this problem while guaranteeing the incentive
compatibility, we jointly use the VCG pricing with a base
access price. Specifically, each type of resource has a base
access price, and a user who is admitted (i.e., a successful
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bidder) will be charged the larger of the base price and the
VCG price. That is
qk = max{qbasek , qvcgk }. (36)
Note that the base price is known to all users. If a bidder is
aware that the valuation of the requested resources is even less
than the base price, she will not place the bid. In this pricing
scheme, the base price can guarantee certain revenue for the
MVNO, while the VCG price could represent the impact of
satisfying the resource requirement of a user to the other users.
For example, if there are sufficient resources, the VCG price
for a bidder can be low. However, when there is an intense
resource competition, the more resource a user requests, the
higher will be the probability that other users will not be
admitted, and the higher will be the VCG price charged to
this user.
Although the objective of each auctioneer is to maximize
the social welfare, with such a pricing scheme, we can
also achieve approximate optimal seller’s revenue. Also, the
incentive compatibility can be preserved.
2) Pricing scheme with approximate solution for the WDP:
The VCG pricing can preserve incentive compatibility only if
the WDP is solved exactly (i.e., optimal solution is obtained),
while it is incompatible with approximate algorithms in gen-
eral [24]. That is, if we obtain sub-optimal S¯∗ and S∗ in (35)
using approximate algorithms, the corresponding VCG price
qk is not incentive compatible.
Accordingly, the corresponding pricing scheme needs to be
designed for the greedy algorithm. Specifically, we propose to
jointly use the base access price with a VCG-like pricing. We
first give the definition of blocking as follows:
Definition 5: Assume bidder k with bid bk is a winning
bidder while a bidder j with bid bj is not accepted. Then the
bidder k uniquely blocks bidder j if the bidder j is a winning
bidder without bidder k’s participation in the auction.
Denote by Bk the set of bidders blocked by bidder k. The
main idea is to charge bidder k according to the highest value
bid it blocks. Note that this value is also normalized as that
in the greedy algorithm. The VCG-like price for a winning
bidder k is
qgreedyk = maxj∈Bk
bj√|Sj |√|Sk|. (37)
Accordingly, the winning bidder will be charged the larger of
the base access price and the VCG-like price as follows:
qk = max{qbasek , qgreedyk }. (38)
These two pricing schemes can be applied in both upper
level and lower level auctions in accordance with the solving
algorithms used.
E. Analysis of Properties of the Proposed Hierarchical Auc-
tion Mechanism
In this part, we analyze the properties of the proposed hier-
archical auction mechanism. We first show that the proposed
mechanism can achieve individual rationality.
Theorem 3.1: The proposed hierarchical auction mechanism
is individual rational for all truthful bidders in both upper and
lower level auctions.
Proof The VCG scheme together with exact WDP solving
algorithms has been shown to be individual rational [31]. For
the greedy algorithm with corresponding pricing scheme, we
consider two cases. First, if there is no bidder blocked by a
winning bidder k (i.e., Bk = ∅), then qk = max{qbasek , 0} =
qbasek . Then, bk ≥ qbasek and accordingly ui ≥ 0. Second, if
the set Bk 6= ∅, according to the pricing scheme, the price
charged for bidder k is
qk = max{qbasek ,max
j∈Bk
bj√|Sj |√|Sk|}. (39)
While according to the allocation scheme, we have
bk√|Sk| ≥ maxj∈Bk bj√|Sj | . (40)
Accordingly, we can have bk ≥ qk and uk ≥ 0.
We also show the property of allocation efficiency in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.2: With the proposed dynamic programming
algorithms for exact solution of the WDPs, the proposed
hierarchical auction mechanism achieves allocation efficiency
with truthtelling bidders at each level.
This result can be obtained immediately from the WDP
formulation which aims to maximize the sum of accepted bids.
Note that the property of allocation efficiency is not preserved
for the entire hierarchial auction which will be shown in the
numerical results. Also, similar observation was made in [13].
In the following, we will analyze the incentive compatibility
of the proposed mechanism. To this end, we first introduce the
concepts of monotone and critical value as follows:
Definition 6: The allocation scheme of an auction is mono-
tone if a bidder k with bid {bk(Sk), Sk} is a winning bidder,
then all bidders j with {bj(Sj), Sj}  {bk(Sk), Sk} are also
winning bidders.
The notation  denotes the preference over bid pairs.
Specifically, {bj(Sj), Sj}  {bk(Sk), Sk} if bj(Sj) ≥ bk(Sk)
for |Sj | = |Sk| or |Sj | ≤ |Sk| for bj(Sj) = bk(Sk). The
monotonicity indicates that the chance for obtaining a required
bundle of resources can only be increased by either increasing
the bid or decreasing the amount of resources required.
Definition 7: For a given monotone allocation scheme, there
exists a critical value qˆk of each bid pair {bk(Sk), Sk} such
that ∀bk ≥ qˆk will be a winning bid, while ∀bk < qˆk is a
losing bid.
The critical value can be seen as the minimum a bidder has
to bid for obtaining the requested bundle of resources. With
the concepts of monotonicity and critical value, we have the
following lemma [33]:
Lemma 3.3: An auction mechanism is incentive compatible
if the allocation scheme is monotone and each winning bidder
pays the critical value.
The VCG scheme has been shown to be incentive com-
patible [31] for allocation algorithms which solve the WDP
exactly. Accordingly, we can have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4: For the sub-auction at each level of the
proposed hierarchical auction, the mechanism consisting of
proposed dynamic programming algorithm for WDP and VCG
pricing with base access price achieves incentive compatibility
(for both single-minded and general valuation cases).
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We will show that for single-minded users with explicit
resource request, the greedy algorithm with corresponding de-
signed pricing scheme can also achieve incentive compatibility
in the lower-level auction.
Theorem 3.5: The proposed auction mechanism with greedy
algorithm is monotone for the case of single-minded users with
explicit resource request. The corresponding pricing scheme
charges the winning bidders their critical values and the
corresponding auction mechanism is incentive compatible.
Proof The proof of monotonicity can be immediately obtained
from the allocation algorithm. Specifically, a bidder can in-
crease her order in the ranking by either increasing the bid
value or reducing the amount of required resources. For exam-
ple, two users requesting the same number of subchannels and
power, the user with higher achievable rate will be preferred.
Then we will find the critical value which is the minimum
a bidder has to bid to win the requested bundle of resource.
Denote by j the blocked bidder with highest normalized
valuation who would win if bidder k is not participating in the
auction. Accordingly, the minimum bid the bidder k needs to
place is bj√|Sj |
√|Sk|, which is just the payment of bidder k
in the pricing scheme.
With monotonicity and critical payment property, it is
straightforward that the incentive compatibility can be
achieved according to Lemma 3.3.
However, note that the result on incentive compatibility for
the greedy algorithm and pricing is only valid for single-
minded cases and it will not hold for bidders with general
valuations. Although there exist schemes which preserve in-
centive compatibility for general valuations, the worst-case
performance is much inferior than that for the greedy algo-
rithm.
Regarding the incentive compatibility of the entire hierar-
chical auction mechanism, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.6: The proposed hierarchical auction mechanism
is incentive compatible with any combination of incentive
compatible sub-auctions at each level.
The proof is similar to that in [13] and is omitted here.
IV. EXTENSION TO A MULTIPLE-SELLER
MULTIPLE-BUYER HIERARCHICAL AUCTION MODEL
We now extend the single-seller multiple-buyer hierarchical
auction to a multiple-seller multiple-buyer model. In this case,
the users are not restricted to only one provider but can freely
choose among several MVNOs. Similarly, the MVNOs can
choose from different InPs.
A. WDP Formulations
The bids are the same as that in the single-seller model. The
WDP formulation for the service broker as the auctioneer in
the upper-level auction is expressed as
max
xim(Sm)
∑
i∈I
∑
m∈M
∑
Sm
bm(Sm)xim(Sm)
s.t.
∑
Sm
∑
m∈M
xim(Sm)Cm(Sm) ≤ Ci −
∑
m∈M
Cresim , ∀ i,∑
Sm
∑
m∈M
xim(Sm)Am(Sm) ≤ Ai −
∑
m∈M
Aresim , ∀ i,∑
Sm
∑
m∈M
xim(Sm)Pm(Sm) ≤ Pi −
∑
m∈M
P resim , ∀ i,∑
i∈I
∑
Sm
xm(Sm) ≤ 1,∀ m ∈M,
xim(Sm) ∈ {0, 1},∀ Sm,m, i,
where I is the set of InPs and xim(Sm) = 1 indicates the
resource request for Sm from MVNO m to InP i is accepted.
Note that the MVNO can only lease resources from one of
the InPs.
Similarly, the WDP for the service broker in the lower-level
auction with explicit user resource request is expressed as:
max
xmk
∑
m∈M
∑
k∈K
bk(Sk)xmk
s.t.
∑
k∈K
pk(Sk)xmk ≤ Pˆm, ∀m,∑
k∈K
ck(Sk)xmk ≤ CˆmJm, ∀m,∑
m∈M
xmk ≤ 1, ∀k,
xmk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀m, k,
where K = ⋃Km.
The WDP for the service broker in the lower-level auction
with implicit user resource request is expressed as:
max
xmk(S˜mk)
∑
m∈M
∑
k∈K
∑
S˜mk∈Ωmk
bk(S˜mk)xmk(S˜mk)
s.t. rk(S˜mk) = R˜k, ∀S˜mk ∈ Ωmk,∑
k∈K
∑
S˜mk
pk(S˜mk)xmk(S˜mk) ≤ Pm, ∀ m,
ck(S˜mk) ≤ C˜m, ∀m,∑
k∈K
ck(S˜mk)xmk(S˜mk) ≤ CˆmJm, ∀m,∑
m∈M
∑
S˜mk
xmk(S˜mk) ≤ 1, ∀k,
xmk(S˜) ∈ {0, 1}.
B. Allocation and Pricing Schemes
The above WDPs are equivalent to multiple multidimen-
sional knapsack problems. For such problems, the dynamic
programming-based methods require huge memory [34]. In
this case, branch-and-bound method can be applied to find the
exact solutions. The key challenge for applying branch-and-
bound approaches is to find a tight upper bound of the problem
with which then standard branch-and-bound algorithms can be
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used (e.g., [35]). Therefore, in this part, we will focus on the
derivation of the upper bound of the WDPs.
We use the WDP in the lower-level auction with explicit
user resource request as an example. To obtain the upper
bound, surrogate relaxation is used11. Given a set of positive
vector of multipliers pi, the standard surrogate relaxation of
the original WDP problem can be expressed as
max
xmk
S =
∑
m∈M
∑
k∈K
bk(Sk)xmk
s.t.
∑
m∈M
pim
∑
k∈K
pk(Sk)xmk ≤
∑
m∈M
Pm,∑
m∈M
pim
∑
k∈K
ck(Sk)xmk ≤
∑
m∈M
CˆmJm,∑
m∈M
xmk ≤ 1, ∀k,
xmk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀m, k.
Denote by o˜ the optimal value of the above relaxed problem.
Accordingly, o˜ is an upper bound of the original problem for
arbitrary nonnegative multiplier vector of pi. To achieve a tight
upper bound, the optimal multiplier should be chosen such that
S is minimized. That is
pi∗ = arg min
pi
S(pi). (41)
Compared with Lagrangian relaxation the optimal multipli-
ers of which can only be obtained numerically (e.g., through
subgradient methods), the optimal value of the multipliers for
surrogate relaxation for the formulated problem can be easily
obtained as shown in the following lemma [35].
Lemma 4.1: For any instance of multiple knapsack problem,
the optimal vector of multipliers for S(pi) is pi∗m = ζ for all
m, where ζ is any positive constant.
With the optimal vector of multipliers, the relaxed problem
becomes
max
∑
k∈K
bkx´k
s.t.
∑
k∈K
pk(Sk)x´k ≤
∑
m∈M
Pm,∑
k∈K
ck(Sk)x´k ≤
∑
m∈M
CˆmJm,
x´k ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k.
Such relaxation can be viewed as considering only one
knapsack with larger capacity. A tight upper bound can be
obtained by solving this relaxed problem, for which the
previously proposed dynamic programming algorithm can be
used considering the similarity in problem structure. Also,
based on the algorithm provided in [35], we can have a low-
complexity polynomial-time (of O(n2)) heuristic algorithm for
obtaining an approximation solution. The details can be found
in Appendix B.
For the pricing, since branch-and-bound approach can ob-
tain the exact solution of the WDP problems, the previous
11Note that continuous relaxation is not used here since the upper bound
obtained by continuous relaxation is dominated by the bound obtained by
surrogate relaxation.
joint use of VCG pricing and base access price can be applied
here which preserves the incentive compatibility, individual
rationality, and allocation efficiency in each level. Similarly,
corresponding pricing schemes for approximate solution can
be applied.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
For numerical analysis, we consider a hexagonal system
with L = 7 cells. We consider that an InP owns C = 100
subchannels and the BS of the InP is equipped with A = 200
antennas. Also, the total transmit power of the BS is equally
divided into 500 power units. There are two MVNOs each of
which reserves 30 subchannels, 150 power units, and 50 an-
tennas (i.e., Cresm = 30, P
res
m = 150, and A
res
m = 50), and the
leftover resources are available for auction in the upper level.
Each MVNO has 50 subscribed users. And in the simulation,
each user requests p units of power and c subchannels, where
p and c are integer random variables uniformly distributed in
the interval [0, 10], and [0, 2], respectively. All the results are
obtained by averaging over 1000 simulation runs.
For solving the single-seller multiple-buyer hierarchical
combinatorial auction problem, we adopt both dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm and greedy algorithm. For convenience,
we use the terms ‘DPA’ and ‘GA’ to represent the use of
dynamic programming-based algorithm and the use of greedy
algorithm in both levels, respectively.
For comparison purpose, we consider a fixed sharing
scheme, where each MVNO reserves half of the resources.
This fixed sharing can also be viewed as the case where
there is no wireless virtualization for resource sharing (e.g.,
each MVNO has its own infrastructure and fixed resources).
Accordingly, the hierarchical auction degenerates to single
lower-level combinatorial auctions hold by each MVNO. Also,
we consider a general sharing scheme as the benchmark, where
the MVNOs are not involved and the InP directly holds a
single-level combinatorial auction for resource allocation. We
will use the terms ‘FS’ and ‘GS’ to represent the results
obtained by fixed sharing and general sharing, respectively. We
also solve the multiple-seller multiple-buyer problem and com-
pare the results with those obtained for the single-seller model.
For fair comparison, we consider the same setting as that in
the single-seller model while allowing the users to access the
services from one of the MVNOs. We will use the term ‘MS1’
and ’MS2’ to represent the exact and approximate solutions
obtained for the multiple-seller problem, respectively.
For numerical analysis, we mainly consider three perfor-
mance metrics for resource allocation: average social welfare
(i.e., the sum value of all accepted bids), average resource
utilization (i.e., the proportion of resources utilized), and
average user satisfaction (i.e., the ratio of users whose resource
requests are satisfied).
We first consider the average social welfare achieved by
different algorithms as shown in Fig. 3. It is straightforward
that general sharing (GS) provides the largest social welfare
which is used as the benchmark. For dynamic programming
algorithm, we consider two group sizes (i.e., the resources
is auctioned in a grouped manner). There are tradeoffs in
selecting the group size in terms of performance and com-
plexity. We can see that the DP-Algorithm with group size 1
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(i.e., DPA1) outperforms that with group size 5 (i.e., DPA2).
We can also observe that the social welfare obtained by
DPA1 is less than that obtained by general sharing. This
indicates that although the social efficiency can be achieved
for each level, there could exist a gap between the social
welfare obtained by the entire hierarchical auction with the
global optimal one obtained by general sharing. This gap
represents the tradeoff between global social efficiency and
the flexibility of intra-slice customization. Also, we can see
that the greedy algorithm provides good solutions compared
with the dynamic programming-based algorithm. We can also
observe that the welfare obtained for multiple-seller setting
is larger than that for single-seller problem. This is due to
flexibility introduced by allowing dynamic user association.
We can observe that all the proposed dynamic resource sharing
schemes (i.e., DPA, GA, and MS) outperform the fixed sharing
scheme. This indicates the resource utilization gain by having
wireless virtualization.
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Fig. 3. Normalized average social efficiency achieved by different algorithms.
“FS” = Fixed sharing, “DPA1” = DP-Algorithm with group size 1, “DPA2” =
DP-Algorithm with group size 5, “GA” = Greedy algorithm, “GS” = General
sharing, “MS1” = Multiple seller exact solution, “MS2” = Multiple seller
approximate solution.
We then investigate the average resource utilization achieved
by different algorithms as shown in Fig. 4. Here we use the
subchannel utilization as an example. The comparison results
are similar to those for the social welfare.
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Fig. 4. Average subchannel utilization achieved by different algorithms.
We also compare the average user satisfaction obtained
by different algorithms and compare the results for explicit
resource request case and implicit resource request as shown
in Fig. 5. We can see that the implicit resource request model
can achieve better user satisfaction. This is due to the benefits
from general valuation compared with single-minded model.
Specifically, for implicit resource request, these exist multiple
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Fig. 5. Average user satisfaction achieved by different algorithms.
resource allocation strategies to achieve the target rate, and
if anyone of these strategies is accepted, the user request is
satisfied.
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Fig. 6. Average resource utilization achieved by different algorithms with
different number of MVNOs.
The impact of different number of MVNOs on the average
resource utilization is investigated in Fig. 6. Note that the total
number of resources of the InP and the total number of users
are fixed for different number of MVNOs. We can observe
that the utilization decreases with the increased number of
MVNOs. This is due to the fact that increasing the number
MVNOs will decrease the number of resources allocated as
well as the number of users associated to each MVNO, and
the statistical multiplexing gain will decrease.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a hierarchical combinatorial auction
mechanism to jointly address the two-level resource allocation
problem for virtualization of massive MIMO-based 5G cellular
networks. Specifically, we have considered both single-seller
and multiple-seller hierarchical models, and the correspond-
ing winner determination problems in two levels have been
formulated and studied. Algorithms have been proposed to
solve the WDPs in a computationally tractable manner and
different pricing schemes have been designed. The properties
of the proposed hierarchical auction mechanism have also been
analyzed. The proposed scheme satisfies the requirements of
efficient resource allocation, strict inter-slice isolation, and
the ability of intra-slice isolation. Numerical results have
been presented which show the effectiveness of the proposed
scheme. For the future work, a valuation function taking into
account the fairness and desirability can be designed.
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TABLE II
A SUMMARY OF MAIN DIFFERENCES OF PROPOSED SCHEME WITH EXISTING WORK
Schemes Differences of the model Pricing scheme Multi-seller
case
Dimensions of
auctioned items
[13] There is a social planner controlling the
resource allocation in all tiers
First price or VCG-Pricing No Single dimension
[14] A middleman can submit bids for multiple
items but win at most one
Designed pricing with reserve price in the
upper-tier, the same price charged to SUs in
the lower-tier
No Single dimension
[15] Multi-layered spectrum trading through an
auction in the upper level and a price de-
mand method in the lower level
VCG pricing and two variants of uniform
pricing
No Single dimension
Proposed Multi-item combinatorial auction at both
tiers
VCG pricing or VCG-like pricing with re-
served price
Yes Multiple dimensions
APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF MAIN DIFFERENCES OF
PROPOSED SCHEME WITH EXISTING WORK
The main differences between existing work and the pro-
posed scheme is shown in Table 1.
APPENDIX B: HEURISTIC ALGORITHM FOR SOLVING THE
MULTI-SELLER MULTI-BUYER PROBLEM
We provide a low-complexity (of O(n2)) heuristic algorithm
by extending the algorithm in [35] for single dimensional items
to multiple dimensions. Specifically, in the initialization phase,
we re-index all users and all MVNOs. Then an initial feasible
solution can be obtained by applying the greedy algorithm.
After obtaining the initial solution, the algorithm improves the
solution through local exchanges. The details of the algorithm
are described as follows.
Algorithm 4 Initialization
1. Set |Sk| = ωcck + ωppk, ∀k;
2. Re-index all users such that
b1(S1)√|S1| ≥ b2(S2)√|S2| ≥ · · · ≥ bK(SK)√|SK | ; (42)
3. Set C¯m = ωcCˆm + ωpPˆk, ∀m;
4. Re-index all MVNOs such that
C¯1 ≤ C¯2 ≤ · · · ≤ C¯M . (43)
Algorithm 5 Greedy Algorithm
Denote by xk the assignment index. Specifically, xk = 0 if
user k is currently unassigned, and xk equals the index of
the MVNO it is assigned to, otherwise.
Initialization: set xk = 0,∀k; C˜m = Cˆm,∀m and P˜m =
Pˆm,∀m;
for k := 1 to K do
if xk = 0, pk ≤ P˜m, and ck ≤ C˜m then
xk := m;
C˜m = C˜m − ck; P˜m = P˜m − pk;
end if
end for
Algorithm 6 Initial Solution
z := 0;
for k := 1 to K do
xk := 0;
end for
for m := 1 to M do
Call Greedy Algorithm
end for
Algorithm 7 Rearrangement
z := 0; m := 1;
for k := K to 1 do
if xk > 0 then
let l be the first index in {m, . . . ,M}⋃{1, . . . ,m−1}
such that ck ≤ C˜l and pk ≤ P˜l;
if no such l then
xk := 0
else
xk := l; C˜l = C˜l−ck; P˜l = P˜l−ck; z := z+bk;
if l < m then
m := l + 1;
else
m := 1;
end if
end if
end if
end for
for m := 1 to M do
Call Greedy Algorithm
end for
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